Department of Political Science
Social and Behavioral Sciences Bldg.
Stony Brook University
Stony Brook, N.Y. 11794-4392
(631) 632-4109 (office)
(646) 275-4167 (cellular) usommer@ic.sunysb.edu
I am a Ph.D. candidate at the political science department at Stony Brook University and will receive my Ph.D. in June 2007. My dissertation committee consists of Jeffrey Segal (chair), Stanley Feldman, Scott Basinger and Jeffrey Lax (Columbia).
Aside from research, I have a rich teaching experience at the PhD, MA and undergraduate levels. This year teaching evaluation survey averages ranged from 1.25 to 1.9 on a scale of 1 (best) to 7 (worst).
Project Director, Tel Aviv University, Summer Youth University Project. The project promotes political, social and educational goals, for 50 high-potential high school students of lower socioeconomic status. Project was under the aegis of the President of Tel Aviv University Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, 2001-03
Founder, Director and Teacher, Center for Preparation for the Matriculation and Psychometric Exams for University Applicants, 1996 - 2002
Project Initiator and Director, the 'Dor Shalom' (Generation for Peace) Movement. An outreach Project for Jews of Ethiopian Origin in Israel - Eighty-five new Ethiopian immigrants participated in the project, 1999
Psychotherapist - Community Center for Mental Patients, Jaffa, Abarbanel Mental Institution, Bat Yam - Psychotherapy with mental patients, 1998 - 2002
A Step Forward from Defensive Denials and Aggressive Grants - Are Justices Opinion-Minded when Voting on Certiorari?
I employ a New-Institutional approach to analyze how the US Supreme Court sets its agenda. I analyze the strategic relationship between cert decisions, merits votes and opinion writing. My basic question is whether justices consider their likely influence on the opinion of the court when voting to grant or to deny review. For policy and for legal reasons court opinions are of utmost importance for justices. Whereas the final disposition may have direct policy consequences (e.g. Roe and the resultant abortion policy) the effect of the opinion is of comparable magnitude if at times of a different nature. For instance, the issue of judicial review in Marshal's opinion in Marbury is not simply an answer to a yes/no question but rather a cornerstone for an evolving constitutional doctrine. Literature indicates that the decision on the merits is pivotal to the way justices set their agenda. However, justices care dearly about the law, and thus opinions, consequential as they are to jurisprudence as well as policy, potentially constitute another strategic consideration during cert. An institutional change following the Judiciary Act of 1925 increased the stakes in each case granted. The decision on certiorari is made in conference according to the Rule of Four, and only 1% of all cases make it to the Certified Orders List and win full review. The Rule of Four induces strategic behavior on the part of the justices (Epstein and Knight, 1998). The stakes are high, but does this mean that justices are purely strategic (Hammond et al., 2005)? Or are they closer to being sincere political actors protected by an institutional environment that insulates them from incentives for sophisticated strategic behavior (Segal and Spaeth, 2002)? Macro- and micro-level analyses are conducted on data from the Spaeth Supreme Court Databases for the Vinson, Warren and Burger courts. I make use of truncated data models, logistic regressions, and Generalized Linear Measurement Error models to demonstrate that justices differ considerably in terms of what factors influence which cases they choose to hear, the effect of those factors, and the extent to which justices behave strategically when casting their cert vote. Whereas some of the justices seem to make no strategic consideration of later stages, others tend to systematically look only one step ahead (i.e. the decision on the merits). The majority of these engage in aggressive grants only, while only a subgroup of the strategic justices deny review of cases they would like to hear but are afraid to lose on the merits (i.e. defensive denials). Finally, only a handful of the justices seem to be willing (or able?) to look more than one step forward - they not only defensively deny and aggressively grant, but are also able to look farther down the road. These justices seem to be making cert decisions with opinion writing in mind. The findings provide a more comprehensive view of the collegial game and its institutional antecedents, as well as a better understanding of the resulting policy and jurisprudence.
This study analyzes the strategic relationship between cert decisions, merits votes and opinion writing on the US Supreme Court. An institutional change following the Judiciary Act of 1925 increased the stakes in each case granted. Does this mean justices are strategic in choosing which cases to decide? Strategic justices, I contend, would cast their votes on cert thinking about the solutions to the collective action problems in the court’s multistage decision making process (cooperation to maintain a dispositional majority, and coordination in creating a doctrinal majority). What they perceive as likely solutions to these cooperation and coordination problems guide justices’ vote on the court’s agenda. Analyses on the macro- and micro-levels demonstrate that some justices are indeed strategic on cert. This, however, is true to varying degrees and in more than one way. The findings provide a more comprehensive view of the collegial game and its institutional antecedents, as well as a better understanding of the resulting policy and jurisprudence.
With the Bork and Thomas confirmation battles the salience of gender politics increased. The fear of a conservative originalist sitting as a Supreme Court justice that will lead to the overruling of Roe was common to several women movements. The issue of women protection from sexual harassment and women rights in general became even more salient with Anita Hill's testimony before the Senate. If we assume congresspersons to be relentless reelection seekers who consider each of their moves in light of their next reelection bid, it is likely that senators voting on those nominations heeded to gender politics. My unit of analysis is individual senators. I find significant effects for women constituencies, particularly when the senator's home state is ideologically moderate. No effect, however, was found for reelection, which means concerns about women constituencies transpire in Supreme Court confirmation roll-calls notwithstanding the proximity of elections. In the decade and a half since the Thomas confirmation, women votes, women organized interests and women candidates have become increasingly central in American politics. Indeed effects are more pronounced in the recent Senate vote on Alito. Yet, I fail to find significant results for the Roberts vote. Finally, I find strong support for the model when tested on a database that consists of all four nominations.
(with M. Eser Sekercioglu) Although it deals with courts as institutions within their political systems, the comparative judicial politics literature has paid little attention to comparisons of internal judicial institutions and strategies. This is done in this paper for the US and the Israeli Supreme Courts within a New Institutional framework. Both the American Chief Justice and the Israeli President of the Court are greatly empowered by internal institutions governing the collegial game. Yet, those institutions are fundamentally different between the two courts. This also means that the sets of institutionally induced strategic judicial behaviors in each court differ. We compare strategic behaviors and their institutional antecedents on the two courts. For the US Supreme Court we take advantage of existing judicial politics literature. However, little literature dealing with strategic judicial behavior on the Israeli court exists. Hence, we use formal modeling to elucidate the types of strategic behaviors transpiring on this court, and then test hypotheses empirically. Suggestions for future research follow.
Traditionally the weakest branch, the judiciary’s toolkit has unique virtues such as well-developed decision-making mechanisms. In times of political fragmentation courts may gain legitimacy and influence by using those unique tools strategically. For courts that make decisions in panels, two necessary conditions – unanimity within and consistency between panels - should be met for strategic behavior of the institution as a whole to emerge. A spatial model is used to show how internal institutions allow the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) to meet those conditions. Further, strategic judicial behavior of HCJ as an institution is demonstrated with the effect of extralegal variables. A logistic model shows that executive ideology, identity of opinion writer, and terror plus other variables predict holdings in security cases. This explains the prominence of HCJ in the Israeli political sphere. Finally, theoretical aspects and applicability to the American case as well as other cases are discussed.
In this paper I attempt to establish a theoretical foundation for a mechanism I call constitutional alternation. This mechanism, I argue, can explain why minorities repeatedly choose the legal path to promote their agendas although history shows that almost as a rule they lose their case in court. Like in politics in general, alternation in the realm of constitutionalism allows minorities to make inter-temporal considerations. The interest of the administration in allowing this cyclical process to take place and the timing of constitutional change are also discussed.
(an earlier version presented at the New York State Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Niagara Falls, NY, 2005)[ .pdf ]
Energy Planning on Long Island, NY
(with Lee Koppelman) This document is an excerpt from the Energy Policy Section of the forthcoming Long Island Comprehensive Plan. The Plan is a publication of the Center for Regional Policy Studies at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
I am an experienced and skilled instructor who is very passionate about teaching. As an instructor I have taught Ph.D., MA, and undergraduate classes in Constitutional Law, Civil Liberties, Methods (math and statistics), American politics, and comparative. This year teaching evaluation survey averages ranged from 1.25 to 1.9 on a scale of 1 (best) to 7 (worst). I have considerable experience as an instructor with advising graduate students in writing research projects that employ a variety of methodologies ranging from limited dependent variable models to time series. Additionally, in my capacities as an instructor at Stony Brook and as a project director at Tel Aviv University, I advised undergraduate students in choices concerning their future careers in law, medicine and other fields.
This course is designed to introduce students to basic concepts in mathematics, which are necessary for the successful completion of the methods sequence of courses
This course is designed to introduce students to key concepts in political science and to important characteristics of some of the world's major political systems.
Published short stories and poetry in several Israeli periodicals and daily newspapers, among them Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv, Yedioth Aharonoth, Iton '77, Moznayim, Gag, Mitan, Shvo, Emda, and Helicon.
Order of the Acts of Love
volume of poetry published by Emda/Bittan Publishers, Tel Aviv, 2002.